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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II developing countries have strug-
gled to achieve economic and political autonomy. The developing 
countries first achieved political autonomy with the demise of the 
colonial regime. l These new countries then began to terminate the 
exploitative foreign investment regime that had originated during 
the colonial period.2 Over time, the developing countries articulated 
an agenda promoting Third World economic autonomy.3 This 
agenda featured a system of trade preferences which shielded de-
1 See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. 
Res. 3201, 6 U.N. GAOR Special Sess. Supp. (No. I) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), at ~ 1 
[hereinafter "NIEO"]. 
2 See generally Akinsaya, Host Governments' Responses to Foreign Economic ContTIII: Experiences 
of Selected African Countries, 30 INT'!. & COMPo L.Q. 769, 769-70 (1981). 
3 See, e.g., NIEO, supra note 1; see generally The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States, G.A. Res. 32tH, 29 U.N. GAOR S·'pp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. Al9631 (1974) 
[hereinafter "the Charter"]' 
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veloping countries from international competition4 and allowed 
them autonomy in structuring their economies.5 In order to pro-
mote these economic aims while furthering political independence, 
the agenda also claimed for developing countries the right to ex-
propriate foreign holdings and exclusive jurisdiction of disputes 
arising from those takings.6 
Western investors in the Third World have come to fear two 
aspects of this development agenda. First, the agenda asserted the 
right of developing countries to nationalize and expropriate foreign 
investments, threatening Western Third World investments. 7 Sec-
ond, developing country jurisdiction of investment disputes can 
reduce the likelihood of a fair trial for Western investors.s These 
fears prompted rejection of the development agenda by Western 
countries9 and legislative expansion by Western courts of their ju-
risdiction over the sovereign acts of developing countries.1O Under 
the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity, an act of a foreign 
government is immune to suit only insofar as the act is one reserved 
to a sovereign entity.ll Western courts employ this doctrine to ex-
amine the commercial activities of developing states and to protect 
Western interests. 
4 See NIEO, supra note 1, at ~ 4(n) (Industrial nations should accord non-reciprocal 
preferential treatment for developing countries). 
5 See id. at ~ 4(a) (asserting the sovereign equality of developing states and their right to 
self-determination). 
6 See the Charter, supra note 3, at Article 2, ~ 2 (developing countries have the right to 
adjudicate investment disputes under their own laws). 
7 See R. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER 51 (1979) 
(Western nations opposed the right of expropriation asserted in the Charter). In fact, fear 
of expropriation discouraged direct Third World investment by Western transnational cor-
porations during the 1970s, leading to a decrease in direct Western investment. See Note, 
Debt Equity Swaps in Developing Countries: Toward a Workable System, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
39,40 (1989) [hereinafter Debt Equity Swaps]. 
8 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 591 F. Supp. 293, 304-05 
(E.D. Mo. 1984) (U.S. plaintiff deemed unable to receive a fair trial in an Iranian forum), 
a/rd, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.), art. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). 
9 See Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texas Overseas Petroleum Company/ 
California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 INT'L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 21, 22 (1977) [hereinafter Topco/Calasiatic Arbitration] (while countries 
have the right to expropriate foreign property within their territory, jurisdiction for such 
takings must be made in accordance with the precepts of customary international law). 
10 See generally Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982)) (United States); The State Immunity Act, 
1978, ch. 33 (United Kingdom) (statutory provisions expanding jurisdiction over sovereign 
acts by adoption of restrictive sovereign immunity). 
II See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 
1976, H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6605 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
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The expansion of Western courts' jurisdiction under restrictive 
sovereign immunity, especially in the United States, harms devel-
oping countries. Expansive interpretation of U.S. jurisdictional law 
by the federal bench has combined with the attractiveness of U.S. 
courts to draw lawsuits to the United States. Claimants against de-
veloping countries are thus encouraged to file suit in U.S. courts, 
which are often far from both the evidence of the dispute and the 
legal domiciles of the litigants. 12 The harm to developing countries, 
however, is not limited to inconvenience in litigation. Exercise of 
jurisdiction over sovereign disputes by Western courts constitutes 
an implicit rejection of the development agenda. 
This Note examines the expansion of Western jurisdiction over 
sovereign acts and the implicit rejection of the development agenda. 
The development agenda, through the New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO)13 and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (the Charter),14 attempts to foster global economic 
development through a system of legal rights and economic pref-
erences inuring to the benefit of developing countries. As part of 
this agenda, developing countries maintain that they may unilater-
ally act to alter agreements with Western interests and resolve the 
disputes in their own courts. This stance has reinforced Western 
resistance to the development agenda. 
This Note further examines the doctrine of restrictive sover-
eign immunity, which, contrary to Third World assertions, allows 
domestic courts to examine the acts of foreign sovereigns. The 
doctrine was expanded through litigation over the Nigerian cement 
crisis, an attempt by Nigeria to abrogate a large number of inter-
national concrete supply contracts. IS The resulting litigation solidi-
fied the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity in West Ger-
many, Great Britain and the United States. Subsequent United 
States cases have shown it is likely that developing countries will 
continue to face litigation in U.S. courts. 16 As the Conclusion sug-
12 Ironically, the expansion of U.S. courts' jurisdiction under the FSIA ignores the 
concerns of fairness which have traditionally informed U.S. jurisdictional law. See Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310. 316 (1945) Uurisdiction should not be 
granted where maintenance of suit offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice .... " (quoting Milliken v. Meyer. 311 C.S. 457,463 (1940)). 
13 Supra note 1. 
14 Supra note 3. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 97-106. 
16 See, e.g., Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco lndusu'ial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 
F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1985) (suit by Venezuelan plaintiff against Venezuelan government bank 
permitted in U.S. court under the FSIA). 
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gests, developing countries may best respond by resorting to the 
relatively more favorable means of international arbitration. 
II. THE REJECTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA As A SOURCE OF 
LAW 
The desire of politically independent nations in the Third 
World to achieve economic independence was the genesis of the 
development agenda. As one Indian scholar notes, "having achieved 
their political independence after a long struggle, the poor ... 
countries of the Third World want to attain economic liberation 
without which their political life is stultified. All over the world the 
poor have decided that poverty is neither inevitable nor tolerable 
any longer."17 The developing countries adopted a program of 
action to marry economic independence to political independence. 
After World War II the developing countries acquired a voting 
majority in the United Nations (U.N.) and used it as a forum for 
advocating an economic reform agenda. The agenda called for a 
system of trade preferences, economic aid and legal rights meant 
to encourage trade by developing countries. In addition, the agenda 
advocated the right of developing countries to expropriate foreign 
holdings in natural resources and to resolve the question of com-
pensation in domestic courts. The developing countries' adherence 
to a right of expropriation has fostered Western opposition to the 
development agenda. 
A. The Economic Background of the Development Agenda 
The inequities that prompted the NIEO and the Charter stem 
from Western exploitation of Third World natural resources during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Western investors es-
poused economic liberalism, which "assumed freedom of contract 
and formal equality before the law, but did not guarantee equality 
in bargaining power .... "18 Armed with these principles of Western 
law, investors soon found that "the surest method of dispossessing 
a native people of their lands and natural resources was to acknowl-
edge their unfettered freedom of alienation."19 Foreign investors 
17 R. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 106 (1987). 
18 Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The Challenge of the New International Economic 
Order, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 1,5 (1984). 
19 See Asante, Restructuring Transnational Mineral Agreements, 73 AM. J. IN"r'L L. 335, 338 
(1979) (citing K. HANCOCK, 2 SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS 182). 
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invoked Western law to obtain large mineral extraction concessions 
from peoples that had no idea of what they had signed away.20 
Typically, these concessions exploited natural resources to the det-
riment of the host country. 21 Colonies and developing countries 
generally gave the concessionaires extraordinary privileges in re-
turn for meager compensation.22 The traditional concession regime 
effected an enormous transfer of wealth which left the developing 
world severely disadvantaged. 
The developing countries eventually freed themselves of the 
traditional concessions. In their well-known study of developing 
country mineral agreements,23 David Smith and Louis Wells of 
Harvard University identified four factors that helped bring about 
change in the extraction agreements: (1) the change in the industry 
structure; (2) the position of various firms in their industry; (3) the 
economic and political conditions in the host countries; and (4) the 
bargaining skill of the host countries.24 Thus, events such as mineral 
shortages,25 the multiplication of small Western firms leading to 
increased competition,26 and domestic political pressure27 have en-
abled developing countries to improve their positions vis-a-vis West-
ern industrial concerns. 
Nonetheless, inequities persist. The capital intensive nature of 
much Third World development, especially mining and creation of 
the industrial infrastructure, forces capital-poor developing coun-
20 See R. MEAGHER, supra note 7, at 51. 
21 The raw materials extraction regime provides an illustrative example of Third World 
exploitation. See generally D. SMITH & L. WELLS, JR., NEGOTIATING THIRD-WORLD MINERAL 
AGREEMENTS (1975). 
22 The typical raw materials concession yielded only rent to the host country. All returns 
from the undertaking went to the Western concessionaire, who also controlled management 
of the resource, set production levels and had sole responsibility for processing and marketing 
of the refined commodity. See Asante, supra note 19, at 339. A concessionaire typically leased 
vast tracts of land for long periods of time at a nominal rent. For example, a 1926 agreement 
between Liberia and Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. granted Firestone a ninety-nine year 
lease on a 1 million acre rubber plantation at an annual rental of six cents per acre. Firestone 
only farmed 190,000 acres. Adede, A Profile of Trends in the State Contracts for Natural Resources 
Development Between African Countries and Foreign Companies, 12 INT'L L. & POL. 479, 490-91 
(1980). 
23 D. SMITH & L. WELLS, supra note 21. 
24Id. at 6-7. 
25 For example, the oil crisis of 1973 drastically improved the bargaining position of the 
OPEC nations. 
26 The rise of "independent" American oil companies in the 1950s and 1960s led to 
bidding wars with the major oil companies for a larger share of the world market. See 
Zakariya, New Directions in the Search for and Development of Petroleum Resources in the Developing 
Countries, 9 V AND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 545, 556 (1976). 
27 D. SMITH & L. WELLS, supra note 21, at 18-19. 
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tries to rely on foreign investors.28 Moreover, fluctuations in raw 
materials prices on international markets cause fluctuations in the 
bargaining power of the developing countries.29 As a consequence, 
developing countries perceive a need to progress beyond the gains 
achieved in the post-World War II period to an order premised on 
equity, autonomy and stability. 
B. The Development Agenda and I ts Features 
The developing countries first articulated the development 
agenda in 1973 through the adoption of the NIEO by the U.N. 
General Assembly.30 The NIEO declaration followed a decade of 
unsuccessful attempts to find a moderate means of furthering de-
veloping country aims.3! The NIEO instead took a bold stance, 
asserting that "the remaining vestiges of alien and colonial domi-
nation . . . continue to be among the greatest obstacles to the full 
emancipation and progress of the developing countries and all the 
peoples involved."32 To redress these inequities, the NIEO advo-
cated "full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural 
resources and all economic activities,"33 "regulation and supervision 
of the activities of transnational corporations ... "34 regulation of 
international commodities markets,35 "securing favorable conditions 
for the transfer of financial resources to developing countries,"36 
"preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries 
wherever feasible . . . "37 and ". . . access to the achievements of 
modern science and technology."38 
Beyond its claims for economic preferences, the NIEO con-
tained legal claims which troubled Western nations. In particular, 
28 [d. at 9. 
29 Accord id. at 10. 
30 Supra note 1. 
31 Such an approach was attempted during the 1960s by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which proposed a generalized system of preferences 
(GSP) granting developing countries lower tariffs on exports to industrial states. The GSP 
failed because developing countries felt it did not adequately address inequities in interna-
tional trade and the Western countries failed to uniformly implement the scheme. See R. 
MEAGHER, supra note 7, at 29-34. 
32 NIEO, supra note 1, at ~ 1. 
33 [d. at ~ 4(e). 
34 [d. at ~ 4(g). 
35 [d. at ~ 4(j). 
36 [d. at ~ 4(0). 
37 [d. at ~ 4(n). 
38 [d. at ~ 4(p). 
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paragraph 4(e) of the NIEO provided that each state has "the right 
to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals [of for-
eign holdings], this right being an expression of the full permanent 
sovereignty of the State."39 While the Western countries believed 
this provision disadvantaged their investments in developing coun-
tries, the NIEO justified the inequity by asserting that "preferential 
and non-reciprocal treatment" should be accorded to developing 
countries in order to overcome the disadvantages suffered under 
the traditional order.40 The division on this point, however, contin-
ued to grow. 
In 1974 the U.N. General Assembly approved the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States (the Charter).41 The Charter 
purported to "promote the establishment of the new international 
economic order,"42 providing for sovereignty over natural re-
sources,43 access of all countries to international trade,44 transfer of 
technology from industrial states to developing countries,45 and 
favored treatment of developing countries.46 The most controversial 
Charter proposition was contained in Article Two: 
Each State has the right ... [t]o nationalize, expropriate or 
transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appro-
priate compensation should be paid ... taking into account 
[the] relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that 
the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of 
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under 
the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals 
47 
In effect, the developing countries claimed the right to seize any 
foreign-owned property, compensating any disseized parties as the 
state deems fit. Advocates of Article Two argued that developing 
country expropriation of private property is justified by the emerg-
ing concept of modern sovereignty.48 
39Id. at ~ 4(e). 
4°Id. at ~ 4(n). 
41 Supra note 3. 
42 The Charter, supra note 3, at Preamble. 
43Id. at art. 2, ~ 1. 
44 Id. at art. 4. 
45Id. at arts. 9, 13. 
46Id. at art. 22, ~ 1. 
47Id. at art. 2, ~ 2(c). 
48 See R. MEAGHER, supra note 7, at 54. 
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The expropriation provision of the Charter led industrial na-
tions to withhold approval of the resolution.49 As Professor Robert 
Meagher noted, "consensus on [this point] would have made pos-
sible consensus on the charter."5o No consensus, however, was forth-
coming. Western countries felt threatened by the use of Third 
World voting power in the General Assembly to sanction expropri-
ation of foreign direct investment. The V .S. ambassador to the 
V.N., Daniel Moynihan, scolded the General Assembly for approv-
ing the Charter, stating that "resolutions that condemn, that accuse, 
that anathematize, do not bring us nearer to agreement. They have 
the opposite effect."51 
It is unlikely that any of the Charter's provisions will be ac-
cepted into international law. The Charter has no legal effect, since 
V.N. resolutions are not among the sources of law recognized under 
the statute of the International Court of Justice.52 Some suggest 
that the Charter and NIEO have the effect of "creating new norms 
in the name of progressive development of international law,"53 
which are proposals "de lege ferenda."54 Such standing, however, does 
not mandate application of the Charter in any tribunal. At best, the 
Charter and the NIEO can be considered as the articulation of 
developing country concerns.55 
The provisions of the Charter are seldom litigated because of 
their dubious legal footing. In 1977, however, an arbitrator in a 
dispute between Libya and two V.S. oil companies, Topco and 
Calasiatic56 (the Topco/Calasiatic Arbitration), rejected Libya'S claim 
that the principles of the Charter denied him jurisdiction over the 
dispute.57 In 1973, Libya issued a decree purporting to nationalize 
Topco's and Calasiatic's Libyan holdings. 58 The companies submit-
ted the question of compensation to an international arbitrator. 
49 The U.S., United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Denmark and 
Luxembourg each voted against the Charter. Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, and Spain abstained. Id. at 44. 
50Id. at 51. 
51 R. ANAND, supra note 17, at 119. 
52 STATUTE OF THE I. C.]. , art. 38 (1945); see also Park, Book Review, 61 B.U.L. REV. 
1321, 1322 n.4 (1981). 
53 Adede, International Law From a Common Law Perspective: A Second Look, 60 B.U.L. REV. 
46,47-48 (1980). 
54 "About the law which is to be developed." Id. at 48 n.8. 
55 See R. ANAND, supra note 17, at 115. 
56 Topco (Texas Overseas Petroleum Corporation) is Texaco's international division, 
while Calasiatic (California Asiatic Oil Company) is Standard Oil of California's international 
arm. 
57 Topco/Calasiatic Arbitration, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 31. 
58Id. at 1. 
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Libya, in accordance with the Charter, contended that nationaliza-
tion "terminated not only the agreement which linked them to the 
Libyan State but also their [sic] legal status."59 The French arbitrator, 
conceding one assertion of the development agenda, stated that 
"the right of a state to nationalize is unquestionable today."60 He 
went on to determine, however, that a country making a contract 
with a foreign entity avails itself of the rights and protections of 
international law and thus makes its action of nationalization subject 
to that law.61 He concluded that "a State cannot invoke its sover-
eignty to disregard commitments freely undertaken through the 
exercise of this same sovereignty" and rejected Libya'S challenge to 
the contract's validity.62 It thus seems likely that international law 
does not countenance the attempts of developing countries to shield 
sovereign acts from scrutiny under color of the Charter. 
Consequently, developing countries continue to face investment 
disputes in the courts of industrial nations, where claims under the 
Charter will be similarly denied. Although a developing state sued 
in a foreign court might simply refuse to appear, this stratagem 
would be foolhardy. For example, a claimant suing in a U.S. court 
could obtain a default judgment63 which could be levied against the 
property of the defendant sovereign in the U.S.64 This is also true 
where a default arbitration award is rendered pursuant to the Con-
vention on Enforcement of Arbitral Awards,65 to which the United 
States is a signatory. In short, the attempts of developing states to 
assert jurisdiction over takings and investment claims is hindered 
both by the refusal of industrial states to cooperate and by the 
ability of aggrieved parties to gain access to foreign courts, partic-
ularly those of the United States. 
59Id.at21. 
6°Id. 
61 See id. at 3l. 
62Id. at 24. 
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). 
64 28 U.S.c. § 1610 (1982) provides for attachment of property of a foreign sovereign 
where I) the sovereign waives immunity from attachment (§ 1610(a)(I» see note 65 infra; 2) 
where the property attached is the object of the suit (§ 1610(a)(2),(a)(4)); or 3) where the suit 
arises out of a taking in violation of international law (§ 1610(a)(3». Military and central 
bank funds are generally exempt from attachment. 28 U.S.c. § 1611(b). 
65 9 U .S.c. § 201 (1982). Any foreign sovereign who consents to arbitration of investment 
disputes waives immunity to enforcement of arbitral awards in any country which is a 
signatory to the agreement. See Ipitrade International v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. 
Supp. 824, 826-27 (D.D.C. 1978) (Nigeria's consent to arbitration waived immunity to en-
forcement of the arbitral award and also to attachment of funds in the U.S. 28 U.S.c. 
§ 1610(a)(I». The presence of many international bank accounts in the U.S. makes it an 
ideal situs for enforcement of arbitral awards under the above mentioned provisions. 
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III. THE DEMISE OF ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE 
EXPANSION OF UNITED STATES JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN 
SOVEREIGNS 
The likelihood of increased litigation in Western courts has 
grown in recent years. Western courts have expanded their juris-
diction over state acts under the doctrine of restrictive sovereign 
immunity. Previously, developing countries could shield their state-
run enterprises behind the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, 
which forbade courts to exercise authority over foreign sovereigns.66 
Since World War II, however, international law has increasingly 
accepted the right of courts to adjudicate disputes arising from the 
commercial acts of foreign sovereigns.67 This exception was ex-
panded by the Nigerian cement crisis,68 in which Nigeria attempted 
to repudiate a large number of international contracts. In order to 
deal with lawsuits arising from the crisis, courts in West Germany, 
the United Kingdom and the United States expanded jurisdiction 
under the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity.69 As a result, 
the claims of juridical autonomy under the Charter and NIEO have 
been further nullified, increasing the likelihood that Third World 
states will face litigation in Western courts. 
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Before the Nigerian Cement Crisis 
International law traditionally held sovereign entities immune 
from suit in foreign courts under all circumstances.7o This principle, 
absolute sovereign immunity, arose out of the presumed equality of 
nations. 71 In the interest of international comity, states restricted 
their jurisdiction by not reaching across their borders to hale foreign 
sovereigns into domestic courts. 72 
The principle of absolute sovereign immunity was first applied 
in the U.S. in 1812. In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,73 the 
Supreme Court refused to exercise jurisdiction over a suit by a U.S. 
citizen against France. M'Faddon hoped to recover one of his ships 
66 See. e.g., 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS ~ 1548 (4th ed. 1985) (United Kingdom) (absolute 
sovereign immunity traditionally prevailed in England). 
67 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note II, at 6607. 
68 See infra text accompanying notes 97-106. 
69 See infra cases collected at note 106. 
70 See 18 HALSBURY's LAWS at ~ 1548. 
71 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). 
72 [d. at 137. 
73 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116. 
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which had been captured and impressed into Napoleon's navy.74 
The Court determined that the French emperor was beyond its 
reach. Justice Marshall wrote that the "perfect equality and absolute 
independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling 
them to mutual intercourse ... have given rise to a class of cases 
in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise ... of 
[its] complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction [with respect to the 
acts of other sovereigns] .... "75 The U.S. courts thus refused to 
examine the acts of foreign sovereigns. 76 
Over a century later the U.S. retreated from The Schooner Ex-
change with the publication of the "Tate letter" in 1952.77 In that 
letter, the State Department declared that U.S. foreign policy only 
required jurisdictional immunity for foreign sovereigns with respect 
to their non-commercial acts and allowed exercise of jurisdiction 
over suits against foreign sovereigns arising in a commercial con-
text.78 This policy followed two contemporary Supreme Court rul-
ings suggesting that absolute sovereign immunity was merely a 
means of protecting foreign relations. 79 The new policy recognized 
the dominant trend in international law allowing domestic jurisdic-
tion over the commercial acts of sovereigns.80 
While the Tate letter nominally expanded jurisdiction over 
sovereign acts, it did not in fact facilitate suit against foreign sov-
ereigns. Determinations of whether immunity applied were made 
by the State Department. 81 Amenability of a foreign sovereign to a 
suit in the U.S. was supposed to be based on whether the suit arose 
in a commercial context. In fact, "determinations of judicial juris-
diction ... were made subject to the exigencies of United States 
foreign policy," leading the State Department "to playa larger role 
in determinations of immunity."82 
In order to remedy the uncertainties of the Tate letter regime, 
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
HId. at 117. 
75 Id. at 137. 
76Id. at 147. 
77 Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Govern-
ments, 26 Dep't of State Bull. 984 (1952) [hereinafter "Tate letter"]. 
'" Id. at 984-85; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note II, at 6607. 
79 See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
HO Tate letter, supra note 77, at 984. 
HI See Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due Process 
Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 474,478 n.32 (1980) (citation omitted). 
H~ Id. at 478. 
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(FSIA).83 By codifying restrictive sovereign immunity as posItIve 
law, Congress allowed the courts to expand their jurisdiction over 
sovereign acts. This is clear from the three purposes asserted in the 
legislative history: 
1) To codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.84 As 
codified, foreign sovereigns are liable to suit arising from any 
action which might also be taken by a lay person.85 
2) To remove determination of jurisdiction from the Executive 
to the Judiciary.86 Application of immunity thus becomes an 
item of judicial discretion.87 
3) To provide statutory procedure for service on a foreign 
sovereign.88 
In sum, the provisions of the FSIA are "intended to encourage the 
bringing of actions against foreign states in Federal courts."89 More-
over, the statute is the sole jurisdictional basis of any suit against a 
foreign sovereign in the U.S. courts.90 
The FSIA has two major provisions. First, it grants federal 
courts subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction against 
a foreign sovereign not entitled to immunity as prescribed by the 
act. 91 It then specifies that a foreign sovereign is immune to suit in 
federal court with certain qualified exceptions. 92 These exceptions 
include waiver of immunity by the sovereign,93 suit based on com-
mercial activity of the foreign sovereign, the "commercial acts ex-
ception" to sovereign immunity,94 and taking of property by a for-
eign sovereign in violation of international law.95 As may be 
imagined, these exceptions have largely swallowed up the purported 
rule granting sovereign immunity. In accord with Congressional 
intent, the statute expands U.S. jurisdiction over the acts of foreign 
83 Pub. L. 94-583. 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.c. §§ 1330, 1602-1611). 
84 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 6605. 
85 See id. 
861d. at 6605-06. 
87 See id. at 6613; see also 28 U.S.c. § 1602. 
8B HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 6606. 
891d. at 6612. 
gO See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683, 688 (1989) 
(FSIA provides sale basis for federal court jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns). 
91 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), (b). 
9' See 28 U.s.C. § 1604. 
93 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). 
9428 U.S.c. § 1605(a)(2). 
95 28 U.s.C. § 1605(a)(3). This provision explicitly gives federal courts jurisdiction over 
takings of private property, thus nullifying the claim of exclusive jurisdiction articulated in 
the Charter. See note 47 supra, and accompanying text. 
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sovereigns. Under the commercial acts exception to sovereign im-
munity, no dispute arising from a contract with a foreign sovereign 
is immune from suit in the U.S. if a sufficient nexus to the U.S. can 
be shown. 
B. The Nigerian Cement Crisis and Expansion of Western jurisdiction 
Over Sovereign Acts 
In 1975 Nigeria placed orders worldwide for a greater quantity 
of cement than it could possibly unload or use. The resulting con-
fusion has been aptly dubbed the Nigerian cement crisis. The crisis 
precipitated the fall of the civilian government and ended with a 
large number of lawsuits by unsatisfied Western creditors seeking 
payment from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) for cement which 
had been delivered to Nigeria. In order to accommodate these suits, 
courts in Great Britain, the United States and the Federal Republic 
of Germany expanded their jurisdiction over sovereign acts under 
the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity.96 The crisis thus 
served as a vehicle for expanding Western courts' jurisdiction over 
sovereign acts. 
The events of the crisis transpired roughly as follows. 97 Rich 
with oil revenues in the wake of the first oil crisis, Nigeria let a large 
number98 of contracts for procurement of cement, expecting a re-
sponse rate of about ten percent.99 The contracts, however, pro-
vided for demurrage on a per diem basis,lOo making the deal very 
96 See. e.g .. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881, 
883 (C.A.) (a case arising from the Nigerian cement crisis prompts the Court of Appeals of 
the United Kingdom to adopt restrictive sovereign immunity); Verlinden, B.V. v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d 
Cir. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (U.S. Supreme Court upholds exercise 
of subject matter jurisdiction over dispute arising from the cement crisis); Texas Trading 
Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 315 (2d Cir.) (United States appeals 
court upholds exercise of personal jurisdiction in cement crisis dispute under FSIA), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1981); Nonresident Petitioner v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 16 INT'L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 501, 503 (1977) (court in the Federal Republic of Germany adopts restric-
tive sovereign immunity in case arising from cement crisis). See infra note 106 and accom-
panying text. 
97 The facts as related below are generally taken from National American Corp. v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 
1979), which is the best synopsis of the relevant events. These facts, with minor variations, 
apply to all of the Nigerian cement cases discussed. 
98 Accounts of the number of contracts vary from 68, id. at 626, to 109, Verlinden, B. V., 
461 U.S. at 483 n.2. 
99 National American Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 626. 
100 Demurrage is a payment made by a consignee to a consignor when the consignor'S 
vessel is delayed in unloading its cargo. [d. at 627 n.1. Per diem demurrage accrues at a 
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attractive to international traders. Nigeria's harbors were soon 
clogged with ships carrying an aggregate total of sixteen million 
tons of cement, paralyzing the harbors and seriously endangering 
the flow of other vital goodS. lOI 
With commerce immobilized and demurrage rapidly mounting, 
a new military government assumed control,102 and suspended de-
murrage payments. 103 Although the cement supply contracts nom-
inally authorized unlimited demurrage payments to the sellers 
whose ships awaited unloading, demurrage payments under the 
letters of credit issued to the sellers were actually conditional on 
authorization from the government of Nigeria, which authorization 
was withdrawn. l04 The sellers who subsequently presented valid 
demurrage claims to the correspondent banks found no largesse 
forthcoming. l05 Nigeria's repudiation of its demurrage obligations 
spawned lawsuits in several countries, alleging anticipatory breach 
of the contracts. 106 In every case the doctrine of restrictive sovereign 
immunity allowed jurisdiction of the disputes. 107 
The cement crisis cases arising in the U.S. are particularly 
illustrative of expansion of Western courts' jurisdiction under the 
doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity. CBN was unable to in-
voke absolute sovereign immunity as a defense to the cement crisis 
standard daily rate for each ship, regardless of the amount of goods it carries. The agreement 
by Nigeria to pay demurrage on a per diem basis created an incentive for shippers to deliver 
their consignments in as many small-capacity ships as possible. Id. at 627. 
101 Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 305. Estimates of Nigeria's normal annual off-loading 
capacity ranged between one and five million metric tons. Id. 
102 Trendtex Trading Corp., [1977] 1 All E.R. at 883. 
103 National American Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 629. 
104 In a typical letter of credit transaction, the buyer (here Nigeria) has its bank (CBN) 
establish a line of credit with a correspondent bank in the country of the seller. When the 
seller then delivers the goods to the buyer, the seller can receive payment from the corre-
spondent bank by presenting the letter of credit and documentation demonstrating perfor-
mance of its obligations. See generally U.C.c. art. 5; see also Auerbach, Letters of Credit - A 
Concise Codification, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 246, 246-47 (1962). While the cement supply contracts 
had called for Nigeria to issue irrevocable letters of credit, see National American Corp., 448 
F. Supp. at 627, CBN in fact issued conditional letters of credit to the sellers on which the 
correspondent banks were not independently liable. When CBN withheld authorization for 
payment under the letters of credit, the correspondent banks were not required to continue 
to pay demurrage. See Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 304. 
105 See National American Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 629. 
106 See, e.g., Trendtex Trading Corp., [1977] 1 All E.R. 881 (United Kingdom); Verlinden, 
B.V, 461 U.S. 480; Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d 300 (United States); Nonresident Petitioner, 
16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 501 (Federal Republic of Germany). 
107 Trendtex Trading Corp., [1977] 1 All E.R. at 895; Verlinden, B. V, 461 U.S. at 497; Texas 
Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 315; Nonresident Petitioner, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 503. 
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suits it faced in U.S. courts. It did, however, hope to show that even 
restrictive sovereign immunity, as codified by the FSIA, permitted 
neither subject matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction 108 over 
suits arising from the crisis. In fact, the subsequent decisions deter-
mined that the litigation spawned by the crisis was within the FSIA 
grant of jurisdiction. 109 The Supreme Court held in Verlinden, B.V. 
v. Central Bank of Nigeria I 10 that federal courts always have subject 
matter jurisdiction over permissible suits against foreign sovereigns, 
since the courts are required to construe the FSIA and because the 
suits arise under federal law. lll In Texas Trading Co. v. Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 112 the Second Circuit held that a commercial trans-
action with a foreign sovereign need have only minimal contacts to 
the U.S. in order for U.S. courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over 
the sovereign. I 13 Taken together, the holdings in Verlinden and Texas 
Trading expand personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction 
over suits against foreign sovereigns, increasing the probability of 
U.S. litigation of developing countries' investment disputes. 
The most significant of the U.S. cases arising from the Nigerian 
cement crisis was Verlinden. At trial the case was dismissed for lack 
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 114 Turning to the leg-
islative history of the FSIA, Judge Weinfeld of the Southern District 
of New York determined that the court could exercise jurisdiction 
of a foreign dispute only where "a 'substantial' effect within the 
territory 'occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of conduct outside 
the territory."'115 Payment by CBN's U.S. correspondent bank was 
held not to create a substantial effect in the U.S., making the con-
tacts between the dispute and the U.S. insufficient to support ex-
108 See Verlinden, B.V., 647 F.2d at 324 (raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction 
under the FSIA); Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 306 (raising the issue of personal jurisdiction 
under the FSIA). 
109 See Verlinden, B. V., 461 U.S. at 497 (subject matter jurisdiction granted); Texas Trading 
Corp., 647 F.2d at 315 (personal jurisdiction granted). 
110 488 F. Supp. 1284, afl'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320, rev'd and remanded, 461 U.S. 
480. 
III Verlinden, B.V., 461 U.S. at 497. 
112 647 F.2d 300. 
m See Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 314 (Nigeria'S close relationship to Morgan 
Guaranty Bank was a purposeful contact with the U.S. which made it permissible to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the suit). 
114 488 F. Supp. at 1302. The court implies in its holding that grounds for €Xercise of 
personal jurisdiction might exist where Nigeria had waived immunity to suit. Id. 
115 Id. at 1298, quoting Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1062-63 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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ercise of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA direct commercial 
effect exception. I 16 
A three judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed Judge 
Weinfeld on different grounds. ll7 The court raised sua sponte the 
issue of whether applying the FSIA to the facts in Verlinden violated 
the U.S. Constitution's grant of federal court subject matter juris-
diction. lls The court found that article III of the Constitution per-
mits jurisdiction over suits by aliens under the FSIA only where the 
controversy "arises under" the laws of the United States. llg In Ver-
linden, however, the contract between Verlinden and Nigeria was 
not made in the U.S., nor was it made pursuant to U.S. law. Both 
litigants were aliens. The only issue of U.S. law raised in the suit 
was construction of the FSIA. The panel held that interpretation 
of a jurisdictional statute such as the FSIA does not raise a question 
of substantive law sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement 
for exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. The FSIA merely dictated 
whether the case could be heard and not whether the plaintiff or 
defendant would prevail on the merits.120 Since the case did not 
arise under substantive U.S. law, the Second Circuit found it un-
constitutional to entertain Verlinden's suit in the U.S.121 
The Supreme Court, however, considered the constitutional 
issue raised by the Second Circuit in Verlinden and found that U.S. 
courts could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the suit. 122 In 
an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court first noted that Con-
gress could confer federal court jurisdiction of any case calling for 
the "application of Federal law."123 The Court found that federal 
courts are required to apply the FSIA whenever a foreign sovereign 
is sued in U.S. courts. 124 Thus, such suits "arise under" federal law 
and fall within the constitutional grant of subject matter jurisdic-
116 488 F. Supp. at 1297-1300. 
117 See 647 F.2d 320. 
116 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. I, provides that "the judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Law of the United States 
.... " (emphasis added). 
119 Since the article III grant of diversity jurisdiction does not explicitly contemplate suit 
between an alien plaintiff and an alien defendant, such suits must raise a substantive issue 
of U.S. law in order to meet the constitutional requirement that the suit "arise under" the 
laws of the U.S. 647 F.2d at 325. 
I~U See id. at 327. Furthermore, a holding that jurisdictional statutes confer "arising 
under" jurisdiction would render the diversity grant in article III surplusage. See id. at 329. 
m See id. at 330. 
122 461 U.S. 480. 
123 [d. at 492. 
1~4 [d. at 493. 
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tion. 125 The Court reversed the ruling of the Second Circuit and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 126 
The holding in Verlinden is a tautology. In effect, the Court 
holds that U.S. courts have subject matter jurisdiction over suits 
brought pursuant to the FSIA because the trial court is required to 
determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction under the 
FSIA. In other words, no grounds exist under the FSIA to dismiss 
a suit against a foreign sovereign for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. The import of this holding is that it allows suits in U.S. 
courts where no issue of substantive U.S. law is raised. Application 
of the FSIA is enough to allow exercise of subject matter jurisdiction 
by the U.S. courts. 
One possible underpinning of the Verlinden decision may have 
been a desire to protect U.S. foreign investment. Verlinden pointed 
out in its brief that "85 percent of U.S. foreign direct investment is 
made through foreign subsidiaries [which in 1977] had over $507 
billion in sales and $355 billion in assets."127 The Supreme Court 
likely thought it prudent to allow such entities access to U.S. courts, 
where they would enjoy both a friendly forum and freedom from 
application of foreign procedure. 128 
Although Verlinden effectively allowed exercise of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of all suits brought under the FSIA, it did not discuss 
the standards for exercise of personal jurisdiction. In suits against 
foreign sovereigns, personal jurisdiction hinges on the contacts be-
tween the dispute and the U .S.129 In Texas Trading,13o another piece 
of the cement crisis litigation filed in the U.S., the Second Circuit 
expanded the reach of U.S. courts by broadly construing the grant 
of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA commercial acts exception. 
The plaintiff, Texas Trading Co., had sued CBN for ordering its 
125 [d. at 497. 
126 Having resolved the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court remanded the case 
for determination of whether an exception applied which would give u.s. courts personal 
jurisdiction over the suit. 461 U.S. at 499. No ruling has subsequently been issued in the 
case. 
127 Brief for Petitioner at 13, Verlinden, B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 
(1983), quoted in Note, The Supreme Court's Verlinden Decision: A Retreat to Activism, 16 VAND . 
.J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 1081,1120 n.245 (1983). These figures include only majority-owned, 
non-bank foreign affiliates and thus represent only part of the exposure of U.S. investment 
held in the name of foreign entities. [d. 
12H Suit in the U.S. spares plaintiffs application of the Charter and N lEO, although it is 
highly improbable the Court considered that point. 
129 See Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d 300. 
130 [d. 
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American correspondent bank, Morgan Guaranty, to withhold pay-
ment for cement delivered by Texas Trading. 131 The Second Circuit 
permitted exercise of jurisdiction over the suit, basing its ruling on 
the commercial acts exception to sovereign immunity.132 The court 
reasoned that Nigeria, having contracted to buy cement, had en-
gaged in a transaction not limited to sovereign entities and was not 
entitled to immunity.133 Moreover, the Second Circuit considered 
the commercial act to have "direct effect"134 on the United States 
because payment was made through Morgan Guaranty, a U.S. bank, 
to a U.S. corporate entity. 135 While the Second Circuit acknowledged 
that this nexus might be somewhat attenuated, it cited "Congress' 
concern with providing 'access to the courts' to those aggrieved by 
the commercial acts of a foreign sovereign" as the rationale for 
broadly construing the FSIA's jurisdictional grant. 136 
The reasoning of Texas Trading thus permits suits by U.S. citi-
zens against foreign sovereigns to be brought in federal court where 
performance of the contract giving rise to the dispute is entirely 
outside the U.S. In such cases, payment by a U.S. bank on the 
contract creates a sufficient nexus to the U.S. for exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction under the FSIA.13i The unanswered question is 
whether this nexus would have permitted exercise of personal ju-
risdiction by U.S. courts in cases such as Verlinden where the plaintiff 
is not a U.S. citizen. 138 What is clear, however, is that the rule in 
Texas Trading makes it easier for a potential plaintiff to show a direct 
commercial effect in the U.S., since a large number of international 
payments are made through U.S. banks. As Verlinden foreclosed 
objections to exercise of subject matter jurisdiction of suits against 
foreign sovereigns,139 litigants can easily sue foreign sovereigns in 
the U.S. by taking advantage of U.S. courts' broad construction of 
the direct commercial effects clause of the FSIA. 
131 Id. at 306. 
132Id. at 310. 
133 See id. at 309-10. 
134Id. at 314-15. 
135Id.at314. 
136Id. at 312, (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note II, at 6605). 
137 See Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 314-15. 
138 Although differing from Verlinden, B. V. with respect to the citizenship of its plaintiff, 
Texas Trading Corp. also involved delivery of goods outside the U.S. See id. at 312. Moreover, 
a West German court has determined that restrictive sovereign immunity allows alien plain-
tiffs to hale foreign sovereigns into its courts. See Nonresident Petitioner, 16 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS at 503. 
139 See Verlinden, B.V., 461 U.S. at 497. 
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IV. SUBSEQUENT ApPLICATION OF EXPANDED U.S. JURISDICTION 
OVER SOVEREIGN ACTS 
81 
In cases decided after Verlinden foreign sovereigns have found 
it increasingly difficult to resist suit in the U.S. Where a plaintiff 
puts forward evidence that a sovereign is not entitled to immunity, 
the sovereign has the burden of showing by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it is entitled to immunity.140 In recent opinions 
construing the FSIA two factors have increased that burden. First, 
courts persist in employing the expansive construction of the direct 
commercial effects exception articulated in Texas Trading. l41 Second, 
grants of jurisdiction invoking the commercial effects exception are 
often based on outside policy considerations. This is especially the 
case where the suit is against a nation with whom the U.S. has 
unfriendly relations. 142 Some U.S. courts have exercised restraint 
in permitting FSIA jurisdiction, 143 suggesting that the door to U.S. 
courts will not be wide open. Suits brought pursuant to the FSIA 
have been dismissed on other grounds, such as the Act of State 
doctrine,144 or on policy grounds. 145 These cases, however, suggest 
that disputes with developing countries will only be dismissed from 
U.S. courts on the merits and not on the basis of the FSIA. 
A. Broad Construction of the Direct Commercial Effects Exception 
The legislative history of the FS'IA supports the broad construc-
tion of the direct commercial effects exception in Texas Trading. The 
House Report on the FSIA states that, regardless of whether a 
sovereign act is taken for a public purpose, "it is the essentially 
commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is critical" to 
bringing it under the commercial acts exception. 146 Where, for ex-
140 Meadows v. Dominican Republic. 817 F.2d 517, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 
486 (1987). 
141 647 F.2d at 314-15. 
142 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 591 F. Supp. at 304-05. 
143 See, e.g., Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de 
Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 203-204 (5th Cir.) (suit arising from seizure of Panamanian boat 
in Algerian waters by Algerian authorities not within FSIA jurisdictional grant since the 
dispute had no contacts to the U.S. and raised no issues of U.S. law), reh'g denied, 734 F.2d 
1479 (1984). 
144 See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985); accord West v. 
Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987). 
145 See Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1120 (court defers to currency regulations promulgated by 
Mexico in order to foster Mexican compliance with the International Monetary Fund [here-
inafter IMF] stabilization agreement). 
146 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 6615. 
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ample, a sovereign contracts to buy boots for the military, it is 
considered a commercial act even though the act occurs in a public 
defense context. 147 The key act in this analysis seems to be the 
making of a contract, an act not strictly limited to sovereigns. 148 
In cases subsequent to Texas Trading the contractual relation-
ships between sovereigns and litigants have usually provided the 
basis for U.S. courts' exercise of jurisdiction under the commercial 
acts exception. For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran,149 the Eighth Circuit permitted jurisdiction over a 
defense contractor's suit against Iran. After Iran's 1979 revolution, 
McDonnell Douglas sued the revolutionary government for sus-
pending payments on a 1975 contract for the purchase of fighter 
planes. 15o The circuit court held that the FSIA commercial acts 
exception allowed trial of the dispute in the U.S. since it arose out 
of a contract. That holding, however, ignored the fact that the 
purchase of warplanes is essentially reserved to sovereigns. 
The failure of the Eighth Circuit to distinguish a contract for 
heavy munitions from other contracts can be understood as use of 
the commercial acts exception to protect a U.S. litigant by giving it 
access to U.S. courts. The facts of the case indicate that McDonnell 
Douglas could not otherwise have received a fair trial. While 
McDonnell Douglas sought compensation for having delivered the 
planes in accordance with the contract, Iran claimed it suspended 
payment because McDonnell Douglas ceased delivery of spare parts 
after the 1979 boycott imposed by the U.S. State Department. 151 
The court upheld federal court jurisdiction because it did not trust 
the Iranian courts to respect the constraint put on McDonnell Doug-
las by the State Department boycott. 152 The Eighth Circuit doubted 
that any of the merits would be fairly considered in Iranian courts. 
Both the circuit court and the district court accorded a great deal 
of weight to an affidavit regarding legal conditions in Iran filed by 
Lewis Johnson, an American who prior to 1979 had practiced law 
in Teheran. Johnson stated that "no such U.S. national can under 
present conditions expect to receive a fair, impartial and just hear-
147 See Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 309 (dicta); see also Hearings on H.R. 3493 before 
Subcommittee on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973) (testimony of Charles N. Brower, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State). 
148 See Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 309. 
149 758 F.2d 341, aff'g 591 F. Supp. 293. 
150 See 758 F.2d at 343-44. 
151Id. 
152 Id. at 346. 
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ing of any such case before an Iranian court."153 The Eighth Circuit 
ruling thus seems predicated on the hostile state of affairs between 
the U.S. and Iran and the inability of the plaintiff to receive a fair 
trial. 154 
Other courts have likewise held that the commercial acts ex-
ception encompasses contracts made in a sovereign capacity where 
public policy favors access to U.S. courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) upheld a grant of federal 
court jurisdiction in Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia. 15S 
The court determined that the commercial acts exception applied 
to a dispute in which Bolivia stopped payment on a rural develop-
ment consulting contract after suspension of Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) funding. 156 It seems clear that publicly 
funded development of rural areas can be regarded as a sovereign 
act. Moreover, AID funding is generally available only to state-run 
projects. The D.C. Circuit, however, seems to have been swayed by 
the position advanced in an amicus brief filed by the U.S., which 
claimed the funding was simply public financing of a commercial 
undertaking, and therefore not a sovereign act. 157 Such a holding 
encourages U.S. businesses to enter into AID-funded contracts, 
since disputes arising under them will be afforded hearing in U.S. 
courts. 
Beyond mischaracterizing essentially sovereign contractual re-
lations as commercial acts, at least one court invoked the commercial 
acts exception where the commercial act alleged for jurisdictional 
purposes was of small import to the matter in dispute. In Proyecfin 
de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela,158 the alien debtor, 
1501 591 F. Supp. at 303. 
154 Inability to receive a fair trial is not always determinative in questions of jurisdiction 
under the FSIA. In Amerada Hess, 109 S. Ct. 683, the U.S. Supreme Court recently refused 
to allow jurisdiction of a dispute in which a Liberian flag tanker returning from delivery of 
oil to the U.S. was bombed by Argentina during the Falklands War. The Court rejected the 
claim that jurisdiction existed under the Alien Tort Statute, since the FSIA was held to have 
superseded all other statutory grants of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. [d. at 688. The 
suit was further held to fall under none of the stated exceptions of the FSIA. ld. at 690-92. 
Thus, in spite of the fact that the courts of Argentina refused to hear the claim, the Court 
would not grant jurisdiction. The legal bases for the Amerada Hess holding are probably the 
availability to the plaintiff of the Liberian courts and the lack of effect on U.S. commerce. 
What is interesting is that the U.S. filed an amicus brief on behalf of Argentina, suggesting 
a desire to protect the fragile new regime in Buenos Aires. See id. at 626 (listing appearances 
in the case). One suspects that the Tate letter regime is not entirely dead. 
155 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
15G/d. at 1545. 
157 [d. at 1551. 
15H 720 F.2d 390. 
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Proyecfin, had sued the state-run Venezuelan bank in a dispute 
over the terms of a loan agreement. 159 In the loan agreement the 
defendant bank had waived immunity to suit in the U.S. in any 
dispute arising from the agreement. 160 The waiver removed any 
objection the bank might raise with regard to the existence of U.S. 
subject matter jurisdiction. 161 The Second Circuit further found that 
release of the loaned funds by the bank's New York branch was a 
sufficient contact to the U.S. to support exercise of personal juris-
diction over the suit. The issuance of a check in New York is hardly 
germane to resolving a dispute over the terms of a contract nego-
tiated in Venezuela. 162 This ruling, however, supports the desire of 
the banking bar to increase the attractiveness of New York as a 
financial center by easing access to its courts. 163 
The commercial acts exception also served as a jurisdictional 
basis for suit against a sovereign entity in a suit unrelated to that 
sovereign's commercial activities. In State Bank of India v. National 
Labor Relations Board,164 a three judge panel of the Seventh Circuit 
determined that the state-run Bank of India was not entitled to 
sovereign immunity under the FSIA, giving the NLRB jurisdiction 
over a labor dispute between the bank and its employees. 165 Al-
though the dispute arose in a context not anticipated by the FSIA,166 
the court determined that the FSIA supported NLRB jurisdiction 
because the bank's activities in the U.S. were commercial in na-
ture. 167 In effect, the Seventh Circuit held that a sovereign's com-
mercial acts in the U.S. expose it to NLRB jurisdiction of its labor 
disputes. However attenuated this application of the commercial 
acts exception seems, it supports the policy of encouraging compli-
ance with U.S. labor laws. 
159 See id. at 394. 
160 Id. at 393. 
161 Id. at 395. 
162 Compare id. at 396 (payment in New York by Venezuelan bank to Venezuelan party 
under contract made pursuant to laws of Venezuela sufficient to support exercise of personal 
jurisdiction) with Texas Trading Corp., 647 F.2d at 312,314-15 (payment in New York by U.S. 
bank to U.S. citizen corporation under contract made pursuant to laws of U.S. sufficient to 
allow exercise of personal jurisdiction). 
163 See Feldman, Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The ABA Position, 20 INT'L 
LAW 1289, 1290 (1985) (discussing the desire of the banking bar that borrowing be considered 
a commercial act under the commercial acts exception of the FSIA, thus insuring access of 
U.S. creditors to U.S. courts). 
164 808 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). 
165 808 F.2d at 535. 
166 See generally 28 U.S.c. § 1605 (no mention of exception to sovereign immunity for 
labor disputes or with respect to administrative procedures). 
167 808 F.2d at 535. 
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The refusal of some courts to hear certain cases against foreign 
sovereigns indicates that U.S. courts do not always abuse the power 
they have been granted under the FSIA. A good example of judicial 
restraint is the dismissal of U.S. suits arising out of Mexico's foreign 
exchange crisis in 1982. In response to pressures from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and foreign lenders, Mexico nation-
alized its banks and forbade the export of dollars from the coun-
try.168 Investors' dollar accounts in Mexican banks were converted 
into pesos at a rate of 70 pesos to the dollar, about 40 pesos less 
than the market exchange rate. 169 American investors who suffered 
losses as a result of these actions sued the Mexican banks in U.S. 
courts,170 claiming that the FSIA commercial acts exception allowed 
the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. 171 
The question of whether U .S.courts could exercise jurisdiction 
over these suits was complicated by the role of the Mexican govern-
ment in the conflict. As a consequence of Mexico's non-commercial 
actions in the affair, the Fifth Circuit in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.172 
was forced to rule on the applicability of the act of state doctrine. 
The act of state doctrine stands for the proposition that certain 
paradigmatic ally sovereign acts of foreign states will not be exam-
ined by U.S. courts in suits over which they otherwise have valid 
jurisdiction. 173 As the Supreme Court noted in Ricaud v. American 
Metal CO.,174 the act of state doctrine "does not deprive [U.S.] courts 
of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It requires only that ... 
[certain sovereign actions] be accepted as a rule for their deci-
sion."175 Thus the act of state doctrine, unlike the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity, is not a jurisdictional rule. It is instead a mecha-
nism whereby consideration of certain questions will be foreclosed 
in cases involving state action. 176 Which state actions trigger the 
168 See Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1106. 
169 West, 807 F.2d at 823. Some investors suffered a net loss of one third of their 
investment. 
170 See, e.g., Callejo, 764 F.2d 1101; Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A. (Banamex), 
739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985); West, 807 F.2d 820. 
171 See Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1106. 
172Id. at 1l0I. 
173 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964). 
174 246 U.S. 304 (1918). 
175 Id. at 309. 
176 In the archetypal act of state suit, the plaintiff has had property expropriated by a 
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doctrine is a matter of some dispute. 177 At best, it seems fairly certain 
that any act which would be immune under the FSIA would likely 
fall under the act of state doctrine.178 
The disposition of Calleja therefore hinged on whether the 
court considered the sovereign acts or commercial acts most ger-
mane to the dispute. On the one hand, promulgation of the cur-
rency regulations by the government was clearly a sovereign act, 
consideration of which would be barred by the act of state doctrine. 
On the other hand, the failure of the banks to honor the investment 
agreements was clearly a commercial act, which would allow exercise 
of U.S. court jurisdiction under the FSIA.179 Considering both as-
pects, the Fifth Circuit first held that the dispute in Calleja arose 
from the banks' failure to honor the investment contracts and up-
held U.S. jurisdiction of the suits under the FSIA commercial acts 
exception. ISO The court also noted, however, that the actions of the 
Mexican banks were the result of government regulations. lSI Ap-
plying the act of state doctrine, the court decided it was not com-
petent to assess the validity of the Mexican currency regulations, 
and held that the banks had simply acted in accordance with gov-
ernment regulations. The act of state doctrine precluded further 
consideration of the dispute and the case was dismissed. 182 The 
court also noted that deference to the IMF plan to restructure 
Mexico's troubled finances required dismissal of the case. IS3 Other 
courts adopted reasoning similar to that of Calleja to dismiss other 
Mexican bank cases. IS4 
foreign sovereign who then transfers the property to a third party. The plaintiff then sues 
the third party for replevin of the property. The non-sovereign defendant would not be 
entitled to jurisdictional immunity. The act of state doctrine, however, would preclude 
questioning the validity of the state's action in expropriating the property. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. at 435. While in this example the act of state doctrine would dispose of the plaintiff's 
claim in its entirety, it is conceivable that the act of state doctrine will not always require 
dismissal of claims to which it applies. 
177 See Note, The Marcos Cases: A Consideration of the Act of State Doctrine and the Pursuit of 
Assets of Deposed Dictators, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 91 (1989) (two views of what constitutes 
an act of state: 1) any act by a government official; or 2) acts reserved to sovereign entities). 
178 See Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976) (public 
acts of sovereign protected by act of state doctrine while commercial acts are not). 
179 Calleja, 764 F.2d at 1108. 
180 [d. at 1112. 
lSI See id. at 1108. 
182 See id. at 1115-16; West, 807 F.2d at 828. 
183 See Calleja, 764 F.2d at 1120 (acquiescence to IMF agreement); West, 807 F.2d at 832 
(IMF agreement dictated Mexican actions and court will not overturn them). In addition, 
the court in West suggested that the prudent investor knew or should have known that 
substantial fluctuations can occur in Third World investments. See id. at 831. 
184 See, e.g., West, 807 F.2d at 828. 
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The Mexican bank cases suggest that the commercial acts ex-
ception may not provide the best test of whether a sovereign act 
will be assessed in V.S. courts. More importantly, these cases show 
that the courts recognized the burden such suits would put on 
Mexico's troubled finances, leading the courts to protect the banks. 
In this respect, the courts' actions are quite similar to the original 
Tate letter regime. 185 
In sum, the line of cases following Verlinden has permitted 
exercise of federal court jurisdiction where important American 
interests are involved. If a litigant can demonstrate both commercial 
contact by a sovereign with the V.S. and important interests at stake, 
personal jurisdiction can be exercised over the suit. As the dispo-
sition of some cases suggests,186 V.S. courts can be fair in ruling on 
the merits of a given case. This does not, however, mitigate the 
difficulties incurred by developing country defendants forced to 
litigate in an inconvenient forum with few contacts to the litigation. 
Finally, implicit in the grant of jurisdiction to protect V.S. interests 
is the reluctance or refusal of courts to apply any law other than 
V.S. law. 187 The net effect is to hinder the acceptance of the devel-
opment agenda into international law. 
V. CONCLUSION: SOME SUGGESTIONS 
The doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity has perpetuated 
resort to Western courts for resolution of private disputes with 
foreign sovereigns. The doctrine has impeded developing countries' 
efforts to control the resolution of their international disputes. It 
has also hindered acceptance of the development agenda into in-
ternational law by channelling litigation to courts which reject the 
agenda'S claims. In order to render a more equitable dispute reso-
lution system, both the Western countries and the developing coun-
tries will have to retreat from their current stance on jurisdiction 
of sovereign disputes. 
The developing countries do not agree with the Western coun-
tries on how quickly international law should change and accept 
185 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. 
186 See National American Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 646 (judgment on the merits in favor of 
Nigeria in a cement crisis dispute on grounds that plaintiff had executed a valid discharge 
of prior agreement). 
187 See generally, R. MEAGHER, supra note 7; R. ANAND, supra note 17 (noting the failure 
of Western nations to accept principles of international law advocated by the developing 
countries). 
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new concepts. The Third World argues in the Charter and the 
NIEO for rapid change. While developing countries have rapidly 
gained political independence, true economic independence has 
come at a snail's pace. The development agenda attempts to accel-
erate economic development through the agency of international 
law. The agenda would allow developing countries to resolve dis-
putes with foreign investors under their own rules, thus rendering 
resolutions most favorable to the developing countries. The devel-
oping countries see this deliberate favorable treatment as a means 
of reversing the inequity of the old economic order and as a key to 
achievement of economic parity with the Western countries. 
The Western nations, by contrast, oppose the rapid change in 
international law embodied in the development agenda. The West-
ern countries have a vested interest in perpetuation of the existing 
legal order. The favorable position of Western investors in the 
Third World was obtained under color of traditional international 
law. Western holdings in the Third World are protected only by the 
good graces of the sovereign and the right to seek damages for 
expropriation in Western courts. The Western countries have little 
to gain and much to lose by accepting the legal claims of the de-
velopment agenda. The expansion of U.S. court jurisdiction after 
Verlinden demonstrates the extent to which Western courts are will-
ing to exercise protective jurisdiction on behalf of Western foreign 
investments. Western courts remain a safe harbor for Western in-
vestment. 
The root of the competing claims to adjudication of interna-
tional disputes is a desire to protect domestic interests. For devel-
oping countries, domestic litigation of disputes is a means of fur-
thering rights asserted under the NIEO and the Charter. For 
Western countries, expansion of jurisdiction under restrictive sov-
ereign immunity gives their citizens greater redress when they are 
injured by the acts of foreign sovereigns. Were the international 
community truly one of equals, these interests could be balanced, 
much as the competing jurisdictional claims of the states and the 
federal government are balanced in the American legal system. 
Unfortunately, persistent inequities in the world power structure 
prevent protection of the aims of developing countries. 
In order to promote the development agenda two steps are 
necessary. First, the aims of the development agenda must be ac-
cepted by the entire international community. Second, disputes with 
developing country sovereigns must be heard before truly neutral 
tribunals. These steps are possible only if the development agenda 
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is put forward on less aggressive terms which accommodate the 
valid concerns of Western countries regarding their citizens' inter-
ests abroad. 
Acceptance of the development agenda by the Western coun-
tries is forestalled by the developing countries' insistence that they 
may both expropriate property and unilaterally set the compensa-
tion for the taking. Reasonable resolution of such issues would be 
possible before impartial tribunals rather than before the courts of 
the investor's nation or of the sovereign. Abandonment of the as-
serted unilateral right of adjudication in favor of impartial resolu-
tion would promote acceptance of the remainder of the agenda. 
Unfortunately, the Third World seems reluctant to soften its stance. 
Some developing countries, especially in Latin America, have dem-
onstrated a concerted opposition to attempts to encourage inter-
national resolution of investment disputes. 188 These countries may 
find, however, that continued assertion of the unilateral right of 
adjudication frightens away vitally needed Western capital. 189 If 
developing countries would willingly resort to international arbitra-
tion, they could structure its terms to be more sympathetic to the 
claims of the development agenda. 
Investment agreements between developing countries and 
Western investors could require submission of disputes to interna-
tional arbitration, thus keeping those disputes out of Western 
courts. In the TopcolCalasiatic arbitration the arbitrator acknowl-
edged the right of developing countries to expropriate property 
held by foreigners. The arbitrator's statement, while only dicta, 
holds open the hope that such tribunals would be more sympathetic 
to certain concepts of the Charter than would traditional courts. 190 
In this fashion, developing countries can insure access to a forum 
which is equally convenient to both host country and investor, is 
relatively impartial and is potentially more receptive to the concepts 
of the development agenda. A move in this direction by developing 
countries will bring them much closer to their stated goal of a new 
international economic order. 
I"" See Debt Equity Swaps, supra note 7, at 48. 
IRY [d. at 40. 
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IYO See Topco/Calasiatic Arbitration, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 21. 
